raccha.ai MCP server

Parse a PEM-encoded X.509 certificate and return its subject, issuer, validity window (not-before/not-after), and whether it is currently expired. Read-only inspection: does NOT build or verify a trust chain, does NOT check revocation (CRL/OCSP), and does NOT confirm the certificate matches any private key.

Create a scoped, revocable access_key bound to a role. Requires an admin owner_key. The raw key (`ak_...` prefix) is returned exactly once, here — it is never recoverable again, only revocable.

Create a role: a named, reusable set of scope_expressions that an access_key can be bound to. Requires an admin owner_key — access_keys can never call this.

Delete a role. Refused with an error if it's still assigned to an active access_key. Requires an admin owner_key.

Poll for the result of a device_start flow. Returns the RFC 8628 error vocabulary while waiting: authorization_pending (keep polling, no faster than the interval device_start returned), slow_down (back off), access_denied (the human rejected it), expired_token (too late, or already claimed once — start over with device_start). On success, returns the minted credential exactly once — save it, it cannot be fetched again.

Start a device-code sign-in (RFC 8628 shape). Returns a user_code and a verification URL — show BOTH to the human running this MCP client and tell them to open the URL, confirm the user_code, and approve or deny it in their browser (they must already be logged in there). Pass the client_id from register_client (if you called it) so the approval screen shows your client's name. Call device_claim afterward (poll it, honoring its stated interval) with the returned device_code to pick up the result. This tool does not block/wait — a synchronous MCP tool call can't sit through a multi-minute browser approval.

Compute a hash digest of an input string. Supports sha256 (default), sha1, and md5. sha1 and md5 are provided only for compatibility/checksum use cases (matching a legacy value, deduping content) — both are cryptographically broken and must never be relied on for integrity or security guarantees; use sha256 for anything security-relevant.

Invite an email to join your account. Requires an admin owner_key.

IPv4/IPv6 CIDR math. Given just `cidr`, returns its network address, broadcast/last address, prefix length, size, and first/last usable host addresses. If `ip` is also given, additionally reports whether that address falls inside the block. Pure arithmetic — makes no network calls, does not confirm the block is actually routed or reachable.

Decode a JWT's header and payload (base64url + JSON, no crypto). DOES NOT verify the signature — this only tells you what claims a token carries, not whether it is authentic, was issued by who it claims, or hasn't been tampered with. Never treat a successful decode as validation. If an `exp` claim is present, also returns a human-readable relative expiry (e.g. "expires in 2 hours" or "expired 3 days ago").

Fetch a JSON value by key from your namespace.

Store a JSON value under a key in your namespace.

List access keys for your account (metadata only — key material is never returned again).

List roles defined for your account.

Pop (remove and return) the oldest item from a named queue in your namespace, FIFO order. Returns JSON null, not an error, if the queue is empty.

Push a JSON value onto the tail of a named queue in your namespace. Push is cheap/open by design — the sensitive operation is pop, not push.

Register this MCP client (RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration) so its name shows up on the human-approval screen during device_start, instead of a blank/unlabeled request. Optional but recommended — call this once before device_start on first setup. Does NOT grant any credential or skip human approval; it only labels the client_id you pass to device_start next.

Request a magic sign-in link for an email. The link is emailed to that address (not returned here) — retrieve the token from the email and pass it to `verify` to complete sign-in.

Revoke an access_key by its id (not the raw ak_... key material). Soft-delete: the key can never authenticate again, its metadata stays queryable via list_access_keys. Requires an admin owner_key.

Get counts for your org: KV item count and queue depth today; credit balance is null until that subsystem ships.

Mint a short-lived one-time pairing code. DM it (or /start <code>) to the raccha.ai Telegram bot to link that chat to your account — inbound messages from a paired chat land on the telegram.inbound queue in your namespace.

Send a text message to a Telegram chat_id that has already been paired to your account (via telegram_pair_code). Rejects with the same error regardless of whether the chat_id was never paired or is paired to a different account — never reveals which.

Reassign an access_key's role_ids (whole-combination replace, bundle-26), mailbox_label, and/or expiry. Omitted fields are left unchanged. Requires an admin owner_key.

Update a role's name and/or scope_expressions. Omitted fields are left unchanged (not cleared). Requires an admin owner_key.

Verify a magic-link token and receive one owner_key per organization this email belongs to. Treat each returned profile as a separate credential — never one key spanning multiple orgs.

Who does the server think you are, right now, for this owner_key.