Is @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server MCP safe to give an agent?

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A factual risk summary built from @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server’s real tool surface, execution model, and verification history — not a vibe. Trust score 58/100.

01What it can do

No tool handshake yet — capability surface unverified.

0 tools observed

02Execution model

Transport not yet confirmed, so the execution model is unknown. Treat as untrusted until verified.

Installs via npx (`npx -y @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server`) — it pulls and executes third-party code; pin versions and review the source.

03Permissions & auth

No auth scopes captured yet (scope extraction runs during the sandboxed handshake, gated until configured). Treat unconfirmed scopes as unknown, not as “none.”

04Verification

handshakenot confirmed

runsmetadata:passed · metadata:passed · metadata:passed · metadata:passed

last_checked2026-06-29 07:26Z

sourcesnpm registry [p4]

Reduce the risk

Wrap @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server in a governed Loadout — scoped permissions, approval rules on write/destructive tools, and audit logging — instead of handing your agent raw access.

Build a governed Loadout

See also: full server page · setup · alternatives